← Sound Encounters

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From reduction to realism

The dominant traditions - scientific, philosophical, aesthetic - have each trimmed sound down to something manageable. Something measurable. Something safe.

Sam Kendall Resonant Thoughts Personal record
Cover of Sound Encounters: Toward a Sonic Realism

First, sound becomes vibration - air pressure, sine wave, spectral data.

Then, it becomes perception - neural flicker, auditory event, experience.

Finally, it becomes symbol - a signifier to decode, a message to interpret, a metaphor.

At each step, something falls away.

Where Deleuze and the encounter stressed rupture over recognition, sonic realism still has to refuse what remains manageable.

It reframes sonic objects as systems of emergence - machines of difference, open, dynamic, resistant to capture.

The wave theory explains important aspects of auditory perception. It links pitch and loudness to physical parameters like frequency and amplitude.

We ordinarily hear a sound as coming from its source. On the wave account, the sound is in the medium. On a sensation account, it is in the listener. Both accounts have to explain why hearing puts it somewhere else.1

What is heard if sound is its hearing?

The wave account raises a different question. Ultrasound and infrasound are mechanical vibrations outside our range of hearing. Do those vibrations count as sounds?

The wave account has value. Its correlations between frequency and pitch matter, but they do not exhaust sound's reality. A subwoofer throb alters posture; a storm roar gathers pressure across air, wall, window, skin.

A recorded lullaby can carry grief decades after its first performance. That grief belongs to the later encounter - to memory, history, recording and listener - rather than serving as proof of a property stored intact inside the sound. The example matters because no single description of waveform or perception accounts for the whole relation.

The term object can be misleading.

It could suggest a static entity, closed and discrete.

We have to walk a line between assertion and reduction - naming sound as real without freezing its form.

Withdrawal is not absence. For sonic realism, it names the limits of what a waveform, sensation, or symbol can disclose about the event.

Graham Harman brings us to the uncanny middle ground.

In The Quadruple Object, he argues that real objects withdraw. They remain irreducible to any single appearance, form, or function.2

This is what allows us to say: a waveform is not the sound. A perception isn't the object.

That sound retreats - even as it appears.

The idea of withdrawal helps me keep the sound open to more than one account. It still matters where and under what conditions the sound occurs.

To be clear: a sonic object isn't a frozen unit. It's an open system that persists through variation and acts through interaction.

In Camilla Peeters’s account of Puce Mary, the artist Frederikke Hoffmeier becomes a sound object among the sounds she makes.3 Here I want to follow the sound itself through its changing relations. A noise performance using contact mics on glass, amplified and looped through delay, isn't a fixed artefact. It's a machine of difference: one that mutates across space, feedback, material, and attention.

A sonic realism must account for perception - without limiting sound to it.

Sounds arise under particular conditions. They act within systems: of culture, of capitalism.

Contingency does not weaken realism. It names the conditions under which sound actually acts.

A sonic object is a machine of becoming - a rhythm of relation, a force that persists through interaction, feedback, withdrawal.

A performance, playing back a recording, and hearing the piece again in your head are three distinct sonic events, each with its own conditions of emergence and withdrawal. Treating them as copies of one stable object misses what sound does across time, medium, and relation.

To study it means following what it does.

To watch how it changes a room, a body, a world.

To listen for what sound insists.

Notes

  1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (n.d.) 'Sounds'. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sounds/ (Accessed: 26 July 2025).

  2. Harman, G. (2011) The Quadruple Object. Winchester, Zero Books.

  3. Peeters, C. (2021) 'On Becoming a Sound Object: Noise Music as a New Materialist Practice', Forum+, 28(3), pp. 17–23.