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Finitude and withdrawal

To say that sound is real is a challenge to more than physics or metaphor. It questions a metaphysical tradition that privileges shape, stability, and sight. Sound, too fleeting, too fluid, is excluded.

Sam Kendall Resonant Thoughts Personal record
Cover of Sound Encounters: Toward a Sonic Realism

Resisting sonic manifestationism does not mean abandoning philosophy. It means seeking those strands willing to grant sound autonomy.

Speculative realism and object-oriented ontology (OOO) start from a radical premise: humans are not ontologically special. We are objects among objects - finite, contingent, entangled. Levi R. Bryant calls his theory of existence a democracy of objects: no being is more real simply because it endures, stands still, or matches our expectations.1

This reorientation asks us to seriously consider the possibility that non-visual, non-static, and non-discrete phenomena - like sound - might also be real objects in the world.

Yet the term “object” remains slippery.

Treating every object as equally real still leaves us to ask how objects differ and what those differences do.

Iain Campbell turns to Deleuze to challenge Christoph Cox’s account of sonic materialism.2

These critiques are important. But they don’t mean we should abandon the idea of objecthood. They demand its revision.

A sonic object is not a substance. It’s not fixed, self-contained, or always perceivable.

It emerges. It resonates. It withdraws.

But it is finite - not because it lacks depth or diversity, but because it is specific.

Its presence is always partial, always shaped by the conditions that allow it to appear. It is real in its contingency (dependent on conditions, situations, or contexts to come into being as it does).

This view echoes Graham Harman’s notion of withdrawal: real objects exceed the relations in which they appear.3

A bell’s tone is not the bell. A waveform is not the sound. A protest chant is not reducible to its words.

Each is only a glimpse, a situated expression, never the whole.

For Harman, the real object withdraws from every relation. I borrow the idea of partial access here. A hearing gives us a sound from somewhere, under particular conditions. Other encounters can disclose things it misses.

Recordings, waveforms, or perceptions never fully capture a sound: each offers a different profile of an object that holds something back.

The hum of a refrigerator continues whether or not we attend to it; you can hear a thunderclap again in your head after its resonance has died away; a field recording doesn’t exhaust the sonic environment it samples.

Withdrawal is not metaphysical mystery; it is a reminder that sonic objects are more than any single appearance or measurement. A waveform does not exhaust the sound; a perception does not exhaust the object. A sound can exceed what one encounter discloses within the time it lasts.

This view need not be opposed to Deleuze’s emphasis on becoming. The “object” in sonic realism is not a static thing but a durational system - an open process of emergence, relation and withdrawal.

Naming sound as object is not to freeze it; it is to follow how it acts while it lasts and what changes in its wake.

It is simply to affirm that the snare hit and the thunderstorm are equal participants in reality, even as they differ in scale, intensity and cultural meaning.

Unlike some OOO approaches, however, sonic realism insists that relation still matters.

Sound is not detached from context.

It emerges through rooms, microphones, bodies, weather, laws, platforms and ecological conditions. These are part of how the sound comes into force.

As Deleuze shows, reality is a field of intensities and potential.4 In sonic realism, this means sounds are not fixed essences but emergent events: a snare hit or storm as forces that act, linger, and withdraw.

A sound can stop while its effects continue.

And it’s why Quentin Meillassoux’s critique of correlationism matters.5 We must be able to speak of a world that exists without us.

Sound must be thinkable when it is not heard. Why?

To claim that sound is real is not to ignore perception, but to reject the arrogance of making perception the limit of being.

Levi Bryant refers to this realism as an ethics of equality.6 No object is more real because it stands still, lasts longer, or fits better into systems of classification.

An ethics of equality among objects does not flatten difference in size, cultural weight, or physical force; it refuses to let those differences determine which objects count as real. The equality is ontological, not experiential: a baby's cry and a symphony are both sonic objects, each withdrawing from complete capture, each acting on the world whether or not they are heard.

Their scales differ. Their cultural charge differs. Their effects differ. But their ontological status is equal. Timothy Morton calls such entities strange strangers: real, persistent, and never fully available to us.7

Sound fits this model because it refuses full availability.

It arrives. It touches. It vanishes.

But not into absence - into withdrawal.

To call sound an object is not to tame it. It is to take it seriously.

As presence, force, and participant.

Notes

  1. Bryant, L. R. (2011) The Democracy of Objects. Ann Arbor, Open Humanities Press.

  2. Campbell, I. (2020) ‘Sound’s Matter: “Deleuzian Sound Studies” and the Problems of Sonic Materialism’, Contemporary Music Review, 39(5), pp. 618–637. https://doi.org/10.1080/07494467.2020.1852804.

  3. Harman, G. (2011) The Quadruple Object. Winchester, Zero Books.

  4. Deleuze, G. (1994) Difference and Repetition. Translated by P. Patton. London, Athlone Press.

  5. Meillassoux, Q. (2008) After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Translated by R. Brassier. London, Continuum.

  6. Bryant, L. R. (2011) The Democracy of Objects.

  7. Morton, T. (2013) Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.