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Against manifestationism

If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?

Sam Kendall Resonant Thoughts Personal record
Cover of Sound Encounters: Toward a Sonic Realism

This question - so often disregarded as a thought experiment for bored undergraduates - unsettles more than it seems.

It suggests a horror: that the world might not exist unless we verify it. That the sonic is nothing until we receive it.

This book begins with a suspicion: that sound is dismissed.

In 1883, cultural periodical The Chautauquan defined sound as “the sensation excited in the ear.”1 A year later, Scientific American echoed this logic: “If there be no ears to hear, there will be no sound.”2

These are among the first recorded instances of the ‘tree falls’ conundrum. But the reduction they point to didn’t begin in the nineteenth century.

Philosophers and natural scientists have long treated sounds either as subjective sensations or waves in a medium. As far back as Lucretius (1st century BC), there were particulate models of sound as a motion in the air hitting the ear.3

Seventeenth-century scientists such as Galileo and Descartes refined this into the wave theory, describing sound as the ruffling of air that moves the tympanum and insisting that what we hear are not objects but “movements coming from them”.4 Physicalist accounts still define sound as mechanical vibrations propagated through a medium.

This is the dominant epistemology of sound in Western culture: correlationist on the one hand (sound is sensation) and empirical-reductionist on the other (sound is vibration).

Either way, sound is not its own. It belongs to something else: the body, the event, the graph. It’s not real - it is derived.

This is what I call sonic manifestationism: the belief that sound only exists in or for its appearance - how it manifests.

The label sonic manifestationism captures something specific: the assumption that sound has no being apart from its appearance in consciousness or measurement. This is distinct from saying that listeners shape how sound is experienced; it is the more radical claim that sound has no existence without them.

It’s a dogma that stretches from acoustics and psychoacoustics to phenomenology. It reduces sound to perception, to physics, to code.

It treats sound as trace, not presence. As proxy, not participant.

Sonic manifestationism names a deeply sedimented lineage: a tendency to collapse sound into sensation or vibration and to deny its autonomy.

Yet for all its explaining, sonic manifestationism doesn’t reflect how sound behaves. Nor how we treat it.

We locate sounds. Sculpt them. Archive them. Endure them.

They persist. They withdraw. They return.

We speak of a sound, this sound, that sound - not as metaphor, but as thing.

Mandy-Suzanne Wong points out that sound is marginalised not because it is unreal, but because it resists our usual criteria for objecthood: it is temporal, elusive, partial.5

But aren’t real things often like that - weather systems, legal frameworks, cultural memory?

Psychologists studying the phenomenon of “earworms” - songs that loop in our minds - find that participants can recall melodies with remarkable pitch accuracy.6

This does not prove that a remembered melody is the same sonic object as its performance. Hearing the melody again in your head is a later event. It is one reason to ask how far an account of sound based on present air pressure can take us.

The philosophical distinction also changes how listening is understood. A protest chant, a racialised voice, or an Indigenous sonic practice can't be accounted for by signal alone. Each acts within histories and relations that a measurement or an inattentive listener may fail to register.

To accept sound as real isn’t a rejection of the ephemeral.

It simply recognises that ephemerality doesn’t preclude being.

Sound’s reality is not exhausted by the moment of hearing.

Feminist and decolonial theorists such as Nina Eidsheim and Dylan Robinson show that listening and classification are never neutral.7

Their work does not depend on accepting sonic objecthood. It does, however, expose the cost of treating what is heard as a neutral signal detached from the people, cultures, and practices through which it becomes legible.

What artists like Wong, and sonic theorists like Marcel Cobussen and Christoph Cox, have begun to argue is that we need a sonic materialism: a refusal to deny the audible world its force and autonomy just because it exceeds fixed categories - a position shaped in part by strands of speculative realism and Deleuzian thought.8

The realism I sketch in this book is such a refusal.

A refusal to reduce sound to perception or vibration.

To treat it as ghostly, ambient, unreal.

Instead, I argue that sound is a material, contingent, temporally emergent object.

To call sound a neighbour rather than a signal is to insist on its autonomy: it does not exist to serve the listener's interpretive project, and its reality is not contingent on being received. This repositioning has consequences for how we think about silence, about sound that exceeds human hearing, and about the sonic events that shape environments without anyone present to perceive them.

Because it does things.

Sound - it collides. Persists. Withholds. Repeats. Affects. And who are we to say, “sound isn’t?”

It is no secondary trace or signal in a system. It is a neighbour.

Notes

  1. ‘Editor’s Table’, The Chautauquan, 3(9) (1883), p. 543.

  2. ‘Notes and Queries’, Scientific American, 50(14) (1884), p. 218.

  3. Lucretius (2001 [c. 55 BCE]) On the Nature of Things. Translated by M. F. Smith. Indianapolis, Hackett, Book IV, lines 524 to 600.

  4. Galileo, G. (1954 [1638]) Dialogue Concerning Two New Sciences. Translated by H. Crew and A. de Salvio. New York, Dover, pp. 101 to 103; Descartes, R. (1649) ‘The Passions of the Soul’, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1, translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, Article XXIII.

  5. Mandy-Suzanne Wong (2020) 'The Thingness of Sound', Sonic Field, 11 September. Available at: https://sonicfield.org/the-thingness-of-sound-essay-by-mandy-suzanne-wong/ (Accessed: 26 July 2025).

  6. Evans, M. G., Gaeta, P. and Davidenko, N. (2024) ‘Absolute pitch in involuntary musical imagery’, Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 86(6), pp. 2124 to 2135.

  7. Eidsheim, N. S. (2019) The Race of Sound: Listening, Timbre, and Vocality in African American Music. Durham, Duke University Press; Robinson, D. (2020) Hungry Listening: Resonant Theory for Indigenous Sound Studies. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

  8. Cobussen, M. A. (2022) ‘The Sonic Turn: Toward a Sounding Sonic Materialism’, New Sound: International Journal of Music, 60(2), pp. 11 to 24; Cox, C. (2011) ‘Beyond Representation and Signification: Toward a Sonic Materialism’, Journal of Visual Culture, 10(2), pp. 145 to 161.